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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
· of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FLORENCE J. ANDERSON 
(PLUCKARD) 
Respondent, 
vs. 
LaMAR ANDERSON 
Appellant. 
Case No. 8857 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the 
Honorable Martin M. Larsen, District Judge, in the 
sum of $13,838.63 for alleged unpaid support money 
(R. 203, Vol. 2). 
The Appellant was the Defendant, and the Respond-
ent the Plaintiff in the court below and will hereafter 
be· referred to as Plaintiff and Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF F A·CTS 
From the marriage of these parties, which was dis-
solved on September 2·6, 1949, four children were born. 
The youngest child, Michele is now age 13 years, Brent 
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is now age 16, Diane will be 18 years of age November 
29, 1958, and Craig, the oldest, is now 19 years of age, 
not living with his mother and is self supporting. 
On the lOth day of September, 1949, in contempla-
tion of the divorce proceedings, the Defendant and Plain-
tiff entered into a stipulation and agreement dividing 
between them their joint properties accumulated as a 
result of their joint efforts as husband and w.Je (R. 4-10, 
Vol. 1). The portion of that agreement with which we are 
here in this action concerned reads as follows: 
"It is further agreed that the one-half of the 
net sales price of this property hereby and here-
with given to the Defendant, Lal\Iar Anderson, 
shall be placed in trust with a trust company 
located in Phoenix, Arizona, the name of which 
to be mutually agreed upon and selected by the 
parties hereto, and that said orie-half (%.) of 
net sales price, less the costs of disbursements 
and handling of the same to be paid by said trust 
con1pany, is to be paid directly to the said Flor-
ence Anderson at the rate of Two Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($250.00) per month for the purpose of 
providing support money for the minor children 
of the parties. That said payments of Two Hun-
dred Fifty Dollars $(250.00) shall be made until 
the said one-half of said net sales price has been 
paid to the Plaintiff herein. TVhen saiil one-half 
of said net sales price of said property has been 
fully paid to tlle Plaintiff as here·in provided, 
the Defendant, Lalllar .. A.nderson~ shall then com-
nlence to pay to the Plaintiff, Florence Anderson, 
I he s1un of Tu~o Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per 
JJ/.onth for the care, support and nwi·nter~ance of 
the Jni·nor children herc1~n. ·· (R. S, \Tol. 1) (Enlpha-
~it' added) 
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The real property above referred to was situated 
in Phoenix, Arizona, and consists of motel rental units; 
at all times hereinafter mentioned and during all of the 
proceedings in the court below, said property remained 
unsold and the wife had possession thereof and received 
the income therefrom. 
The stipulation and agreement of the parties here-
inabove referred to was incorporated into and became 
a part of the decree of divorce, wherein it was ordered: 
"And it is further ordered that the provisions 
of said stipulation and each rund every one of 
them ,be and the same hereby are incorporated 
into this decree by this referenee and 1nade a 
part hereof and that each of said parties receive 
the respective shares agreed upon therein and that 
each perform the respective obligations imposed 
upon each therein and that the support of the 
minor children of the parties be paid as provided 
therein." (R. 16, Vol. 1.) (En1phasis added) 
On or about the 11th day of August, 19'52, Plaintiff 
filed in the Third J udicitl District Court a petition for 
order to show cause (R. 17, Vol. 1) in which the Plain-
tiff alleged : 
"That pursuant to said decree Plaintiff was 
awarded $200.00 per month for the care, support 
and maintenance of the minor children of the 
parties. That since the entering of said decree, 
and up to and including the lOth day of August, 
1952, there was due and owing to Plaintiff, under 
the said decree for the support, care and mainten-
ance of the minor children of the parties, the 
sum of $7,000.00." 
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Order to show cause issued (R. 19, Vol. 1). The 
Defendant cross-petitioned (R. 21, Vol. 1) and alleged: 
"Defendant alleges that under the Decree 
payments for support are not due to the Plain-
tiff at this time since the Decree provides that 
a certain property was to be sold by either of 
the parties and one half of the net proceeds of 
the sale applied to the support of the children at 
the rate of $250.00 per month, and that such 
property has not been sold." (R. 21, Vol. 1) 
The cause argued before the court on the 22nd dav 
of August, .1952·, the court_ on August 26, 1952, entered 
its Findings in part as follows: 
"That under the terms of the divorce decree 
here~tofore entered in the above entitled action 
the defendant was ordered to pay to Plaint~rt 
for the support and mai·ntentnce of the four minor 
-children of the parties the sum of $200.00 per 
month, iJ.e., $50.00 for each minor child; that there 
has accrued as such support money up to and 
inclu9-ing August 10, 1952, the sum of $7 ,000.00, 
of which amount the defendant has paid $2,515.00, 
that there is now due and owing to Plaintiff by 
Defendtnt back support money in the sum of 
$4,484.41." (R. 24, Vol. 1) (En1phasis added) 
On the date last above 1nentioned the court then 
made its order and decreed, the pertinent part of which 
is as follows: 
"1. That plaintiff be and she is hereby 
awarded judgment against defendant for back 
support money in the sum of $4,484.41, for $125.00 
attorney's fees and costs. 
"2. That the property described in para-
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
graph 3, subsection (c) of the Stipulation and 
Agreement specif~cally incorporated in the di-
vorce decree be sold as soon .as possiJble. (Empha-
sis added) 
"3. That defendant is hereby found in con-
tempt of court and sentenced to serve 30 days 
in the County Jail for hjs wilfull failure to comply 
with the decree of the court; that said sentence 
is hereby suspended upon defendant's compliance 
with the following conditions: That defendant 
pay to plaintiff the suin of $300.00 per month 
commencing on the 1st day of September, 1952, 
and payable on the 1st day of each and every 
month thereafter until the further order of the 
court; said payments to be made at the office 
of the Clerk of Salt Lake County and to be allo-
cated as follows: $200.00 per month as current 
support money and $100.00 per month to apply 
on the back support money." (R. 26, 27; Vol. l) 
Thereafter, upon affidavit of the plaintiff, the court, 
Honorable Clarence E. Baker presiding, did on the lOth 
day of February, 1953, order the arrest of the Defend-
ant for the wilful failure to comply with the order of 
the court, dated the 26th day of August, 1952. (R. 30, 
Vol. 1) 
On May 1, 1953, the Defendant petitioned the Third 
Judicial District Court to vacate its order (R. 31, Vol. 
1). The matter was argued to the court and taken 
under advisement on 12th day of September, 1953. 
The court on the 5th day of February, 1954, ordered 
the petition dismissed. (R. 37, 84, 86; Vol. 1). Defendant 
appealed and this honorable court dismissed the appeal 
on the ground and for the reason that the appeal had not 
been taken in time and that failure to do so was juris-
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dictional and notice by the court sua sponte,_ Anderson, 
vs. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277, 282 P. 2d, 845 (April 26, 
1955 ). 
Thereafter, upon the petition of the Defendant, this 
court, in the case of LaMar Anderson, Appellant, vs. 
The Honorable Clarence E. Baker, Jttdge of the Third 
Judicial DiJstrict in and for Salt Lake County and George 
Beckstead, Defendants, issued a temporary writ pre-
venting the imprisonment of the Defendant for contempt 
for failure to comply with the Baker Decree. This Court 
in said case, 5 Utah 2d 33 296 Pac. (2nd) 283, refused to 
make the writ permanent but "remanded the matter to the 
court_ below where the equity of confinement pursuant to 
adjudication of contempt is to be deterrnined and action 
taken on that determination." 
On April 17, 1957, the Plaintiff again by affidavit 
petitioned in the District Court of Salt Lake County for, 
among other things, for judgment for alleged unpaid 
support money in the sum of $11,722.11 (R. 1-3, Vol. 2). 
Order to show cause issued (R. 4-5, \T ol. 2). The De-
fendant cross-petitioned and, among other things, al-
leged: that under the Decree of Divorce, support money 
was not due to the Plaintiff since the decree provided the 
Plaintiff was not entitled to support money until certain 
property had been sold, (hereinafter referred to as the 
West McKinley St. property), the proceeds divided 
equally between Plaintiff and Defendant, with Defend-
ant's half thereof placed in trust to be paid over to the 
·Plaintiff until exhausted for the support of the children 
at the rate of $250.00 per month, and that such property 
had not been sold (R. 7-8, Vol. 2). 
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F·urther, in the alternate, the Defendant alleged 
that Plaintiff had collected the rents from the property 
that such should be applied toward such amount, if any, 
found due or that he be awarded damages for plaintiff's 
refusal to sell (R. 8, 9, 11, 38; Vol. 2). 
Also, further, that by reason of the Plaintiff's re-
fusal to sell the property, she is estopped from asserting 
any claim for support money (R. 9, Vol. 2). 
And again, that the decree entered by Judge Baker 
on August 26, 1952, was null and void as being contrary 
to the provisions of this decree of September 26, 1949 
(R. 10, Vol. 2). 
Also, further, if any money was due and owing, 
that while defendant has custody of the children, sup-
porting them, that as to back support money, that pay-
ment of back support money be fixed at $50.00 a month 
(R. 10, Vol. 2). 
It was stipulated Defendant had paid to Plaintiff 
$4,931.91 since the entry of the Baker Decree on August 
26, 1952 (R. 11, Vol. 2). 
Since the divorce, the Plaintiff has lived in Phoenix 
and at the time of the entry of the decree of divorce 
on September 26, 1949, and ever since, the Plaintiff 
was and has been in possession of the West Mckinley 
Street property (rental units) in Phoenix, Arizona, 
which according to the Decree of Divorce was to be 
sold and 1f2 of the proceeds awarded to Defendant, but 
to be held in trust and paid to Plaintiff for the support 
of the children at the rate of $250.00 per month and 
when said 1f2 had been paid to Plaintiff (exhausted) 
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then the payment of support money at the rate. of $200000 
per month was to become commence (Ro 41, Vol. 2)0 It is 
and was income property consisting of seven rental units 
(Ro 42, Vol. 2) 0 Plaintiff always collected the rents, ap-
propriating the money to her use (R. 42-53, Vol. 2)0 She 
testified she kept no records of the money received, 
saying however that for each of the years 1950 to 1g.54 
inclusive, the gross receipts amounted to only $100 to 
$200 (Ro 43-53, Vol. 2), and none for 1955 (Ro 52, Vol. 2)0 
She had no records for the year 1956, it being in Arizona 
(Ro 52, 53, Vol. 2), however, from July, 1956 to end of 
year, she received $863000, so she said (R. 54, Vol. 2) 0 
During the forepart of 1956, the units were remodeled 
by Plaintiff (Ro 53, Vol. 2')0 In 1947, Defendant re-
modeled 3 of the units at a cost of $3,500o00o (R. 140-141, 
Vol. 2)o 
Although Plaintiff testified she had no records of 
income from the rental units, she did however keep with 
care records of expenses for the years 1949 to 1952 inclu-
sive and that, although the gross income during this 
period was only from $100 to $200 per year, the expenses 
for the same period was $6,293.17 (R. 55-58, 73, 71; Vol. 
2') (Exhibit 4-P and 5-P - R. 71, 77; \T ol. 2). Plaintiff 
paid for electricity used on the premises the last four 
months of 1949 the sum of $119.19, in 1950 the sum· of 
$334.18 with bills missing for three n1onths, in 1951 the 
su1n of $342.73 with bills for four n1onths missing and 
1952 for six months, $210.02. (R. 56-58, Exhibit 4-P, 
Vol. 2). 
Defendant who lived m Salt Lake City after the 
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divorce testified that prior to the divorce, the rental units 
were approximately 100% occupied all but during the 
summer months, when they were 80% occupied (R. 108, 
Vol. 2) ; that after the divorce in 1949, he made several 
trips to Phoenix through 1952 and the units were occu-
pied in the same percentages (R. 108-110, Vol. 2) ; that 
the 7 units brought in approximately a gross income of 
$250 a month, leaving a net income of approximately 
$180.00 a month (R. 108, Vol. 2). 
Plaintiff kept no records after the entry of the 
Baker Decree. She said, "because of its provisions" 
(R. 56, Vol. 2) except, she says, they have some records 
after the property was remodeled in 1956. 
The property is situated within a commercial zoning 
area just 133 feet off Grand Ave. which is a main thor-
oughfare, 3 highways - 60, 70, and 89, and just across 
the street from the Desert Sun Motel, which is a first 
class motel (Deposition of Vern R. Quintel p. i6). 
At the time of divorce, the property had a fair 
market value of $15,000 to $20,000- (R .. 118, Vol. 2) al-
though Plaintiff in this proceeding testified it was worth-
less at the time of the divorce (R. 58-59, Vol. 2). How-
ever, December 13, 1948, she put its value at $18,000 
(Defendant offered Exhibit 3-D R. 60-61, Vol. 2) which 
was refused. 
In the Baker Decree of August 26, 1952, he directed 
the property sold as soon as possible (R. 26-27, Vol. 2). 
Plaintiff refused to sell both before and after the e·ntry 
of this decree (R. 89-115-117-122-124, Vol. 2) and she 
also refused to list it with a real estate broker for sale. 
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(R·. 62., Vol. 2). She said she had a HFor Sale" sign on 
the property until 1955, also advertised in newspaper 
with only one inquiry (R. 86-87-90, Vol. 2). However 
Plaintiff did submit an alleged offer of $19rl.20 on July 
17, 1953, from her uncle, J. Standified (R. 66, Vol. 2) 
for the purchase of the property (R. 88, 11-D, Vol. 2). 
On July 23, 1953, counsel for Defendant submitted a 
counter offer of $2,000.00 net (R. 88-90, 93-95, Vol. 2, 
Exhibit 10-D) which Plaintiff refused. 
In August or September, 1952, after the entry of 
the Baker Decree, Defendant went to Phoenix and at-
tempted to secure the aid of the Plaintiff's uncle, J. 
Standified, to whom they owed $3,000 (one-half of which 
was to be paid by each party) (R. ±to 16, \-.-ol. 2), to sell 
the property, but was refused (R. 110-114, 117, Vol. 2'). 
Subsequently, Plaintiff's uncle sued the parties and re-
duced his claim to judgment and purchased the property 
at execution sale on April 21, 1955, (Ex. 8-P, R. 91, Vol. 
2). The Plaintiff, however, re1nained in possession and 
has collected all the rents, which she has appropriated to 
her own use (R. 42-53, 63, Vol. 2) and in 1956, Plaintiff 
remodeled the property at a cost of $7,61±.88 on her own 
initiative, without a request of her uncle, under an 
agreement entered into by Plaintiff and her present 
husband (R. 66, 70, 91, 164; Ex. 9-P; \;ol. 2). She testified 
that she and her present husband borrowed $2,500 from 
the First National Bank of Phoenix, Arizona, under a 
Title I FHA Loan with which to pay for the improve-
ments, of which they applied only $1,500 for this purpose. 
The cost of remodeling was to be paid from the income to 
10 
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R. 66-67, 91, Vol. 2.). The Plaintiff did not pay the con-
tractor and he filed suit for same (R. 91; Ex. 9-D; Vol. 
2). She did not ask her uncle to pay the cost of remodel-
ing, her husband saying it was hers and his obligation 
(R. 164, Vol. 2). The claim was reduced to judgment and 
bought at sheriff's sale by the contractor (R. 67, Vol. 2). 
At the time of this hearing, the redemption period had 
not expired. 
Plaintiff claimed, after the sheriff's sale to her uncle, 
she had no interest in the property; that her uncle was 
going to give it to her children in his will ( R. 66, Vol 2). 
However, her present husband, whom she married in 
February, 1954, and who· since had been, with Plaintiff, 
collecting the rents, testified (R. 158, 161, 163, Vol. 2) he 
knew nothing of his wife's dealings and arrangements 
with her uncle (R. 165, Vol. 2). 
After the property was remodeled, the Plaintiff re-
ceived from $2.50 to $280 a month (R. 161, Vol. 2). 
The city of Phoenix has almost doubled- its popu-
lation since the second World War (R. 160, Vol. 2). 
The Defendant has never received a credit for the 
income received from the property against any support 
money obligations. 
On May 16, 1957, the three younger children then 
under eighteen years of age were adjudged to be ne-
glected by their mother, the Plain tiff herein, by the 
Juvenile Court of the Superior Court of Maricopa 
County, State of Arizona, made wards of the court, 
placed in the custody of the Maricopa County Depart-
ment of Public Welfare, and placed in a foster home 
11 
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in Phoenix until July, 1957, when they were placed in 
the custody of the De~endant, with whom they still 
reside (R. 189·-190, Vol. 2) in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
STATEMENT OF POINT·S 
POINT I. 
THE COURT E R R E D · IN ENTERING JUDGMENT 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT FOR THE REA80'N THAT 
SUPPO:RT MONEY DID NOT ATTACH AND BECO·ME PAY-
ABLE UNTIL THE WEST M·CKINLEY ST. PROPERTY HAD 
BEEN SOLD, ONE HALF OF THE PROCEEDS, THE DE-
FENDANT'S SHARE, PLACED IN TRUS'T AND USED UP 
AT THE RATE ($250.00 per month) FOR THE SUPPORT 
OF HIS CHILDREN. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS ESTO:PPED TO CLAIM ANY 
SUPPORT MONEY, AS SHE FAILED TO DO EQUITY 
IN REFUSING AND FAILING T·O SELL THE PROPERTY 
AS PROVIDED· IN THE DECREE OF DIVORCE, AND AS 
DIRECTED BY THE BAKER DECREE OF AUGUST 26, 1952. 
POINT III. 
IN THE ALTERNATE, THE COURT ERRED IN FAIL-
ING TO FIND THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ESTO:PPED FROM 
CLAIMING ANY SUPPORT MONEY BECAUSE OF HER 
WILFUL FAILURE TO KEEP RECORDS OF THE INCOME 
RECEIVED AND HER FALSIFICATION OF THE AMOUNT 
RECEIVED AND BECAUSE OF THE COURT'S INABILITY 
TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF INCOME RECEIVED 
FROM THE PROPERTY. 
POINT IV 
THAT, IN THE ALTERNATE, THE COURT ERRED IN 
FAILING TO FIND THAT RENTS AND PROFITS RE-
CEIVED FROM THE PROPERTY ARE PROPER AS OFF· 
SET'S AGAINS'T SUPP'ORT MO·NEY, IF ANY. 
12 
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POINT V. 
IN THE ALTERNATE, THE COURT ERRED IN FAIL-
ING TO FIND THE VALUE OF THE PR.OPERTY, AND 
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE SUFFERED BY DEFENDANT 
IN PLAINTIFF'S REFUSAL TO SELL THE PROPERTY. 
POINT VI. 
THE CO·URT ERRED IN REFUSING T'O ADMIT INTO 
EVIDENCE DEFENDANT'S, OFFERED EXHIBIT 3. 
POINT VII. 
THE CO·URT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF 
HAD MADE REASONABLE ATTEMPT TO FIND A BUYER 
FOR THE PROPERTY, AND WAS UNABLE TO DO SO, 
AND THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT COOPERATE WITH 
PLAINTIFF TO SECURE A BUYER, AND THAT HE TOO·K 
INCON,CLUSIVE STEPS OF HIS OWN TO SELL l'T. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERR E D IN ENTERING JUDGMENT 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT FOR THE REASON THAT 
SUPPORT MO·NEY DID NOT ATTACH AND BECOME PAY-
ABLE UNTIL THE WEST MCKINLEY ST. PROPERTY HAD 
BEEN SOLD, ONE HALF OF THE PROCEEDS, THE DE-
FENDANT'S SHARE, PLACED IN TRUS'T AND USED UP 
AT THE RATE ($250.00 per month) FOR THE SUPPORT 
OF HIS CHILDREN. 
The action commenced in the court below was by 
affidav~t (R. 1-3, Vol. 2) and order to show oause, (R. 
4-5, Vol. 2) based upon a divorce decree (R. 15, Vol. 1), in 
which plaintiff incorrectly alleged that the said decree 
provided for the payment of $200.00 per month for the 
support and maintenance of the minor children of the 
parties. Had the action in the court below been a petition 
to modify the decree, then the court, without altering the 
13 
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terms of the original decree which was based upon the 
facts existent at the t:lrne said decree was made, would 
have been in a position to adjudicate the equities and 
to give to the wife in that cause any proper relief for 
which she could show entitlement. It was error for the 
court below to alter the terms of the original decree by 
proceeding under an order to show cause. Cody v. Cody, 
4'l Utah 456, 154 P. 952. So long as an original decree 
stands, the parties are bound by the terms thereof; 
this court so held a husband, ( Osmus v. Osmus, 114 Utah 
216, 198 P. 2d 233) and a wife must also be so held-. 
at least until she pleads and proves a change in circum-
stances such as to require, in fairness and equity, a 
change in the terms of the decree. Osm·us v. Osmus, supra, 
and cases there cited. 
We do not here contend that a decree of divorce in 
which a property settlement agreement has been incor-
porated cannot he modified. Our law provides for sub-
sequent changes and new orders, 30-3-5, U·CA 1953; but 
subsequent changes cannot be made without limitation 
and a court cannot change or modify a judgment at will. 
In the instant case (R. 15, Vol. 1), the decree of 
divorce provides, in part: 
"4. That the plaintiff, Florence J. Anderson, 
be not awarded any alimony and that henceforth 
she not be entitled to any; the said plaintiff, hav-
ing in her stipulation with the defendant, elected 
to receive a cash award as alunony and as and for 
complete settle1nent of the same as provided in 
said stipulation. * * • 
"6. And it is further ordered that the pro-
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visions of said stipulation and each and every one 
of them, be and the same hereby are incorporated 
into this decree by this reference and made a part 
hereof and that each of said parties receive the 
respective shares agreed upon therein and that 
each perform the respective obligations ~mposed 
upon each therein and that the support of the 
minor children of the parties be paid as prov~ded 
therein." (Emphasis added) 
The stipulation and agreement (R. 4, Vol. 1), 
the terms of which the court ordered the parties to com~ 
ply with, provides: 
"5. It is further agreed between the parties, 
subject to the approval of the Court, that the pro-
perty described in suparagraph (c) of paragraph 
3 of this stipulation shall be sold, and that either 
of the parties may list the same for sale after Oc-
tober 1, 1949, and that the plaintiff, Florence 
Anderson, may have the income from said pro-
perty until the same has been sold. 
"It is agreed between the parties hereto that 
the one-half ( ¥2) of the net sales price of this 
property shall be the sole and separate property 
and money of the plaintiff, and that she receive 
the same in full payment and satisfaction of any 
and all present or future claim of alimony from 
the defendant, LaMar Anderson, and that she 
waives any and further claim to any right to 
alimony. 
"It is further agreed that the one-half of the 
net sales price of this property hereby and here-
with given to the defendant, LaMar Anderson, 
shall be placed in trust with a trust company 
located in Phoenix, Arizona, the name of which 
to be mutually agreed upon and selected by the 
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parties hereto, and that said one-half (%) of net 
sales price, less the costs of disbursements and 
handling of the same to be paid by said trust com-
pany, is to be paid directly to the said Florence 
Anderson at the rate of Two Hundred Fifty Dol-
lars ($250.00) per month for the purpose of pro-
viding support money for the minor children of 
the parties. That said payments of Two Hundred 
Dollars ( $250.00) shall be made until the said 
one-half of said net sales prices has been paid 
to the plaintiff herein. When said one-half of 
said net sales price of said· property .has been 
fully paid to the plaintiff as herein provided, the 
defendant, LaMar Anderson, shall then commence 
to pay to the plaintiff, Florence Anderson, the 
sum of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month 
for the care, support and maintenance of the 
minor children herein." 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the decree and 
of the stipulation and agreement as above set out, the 
court below found said LaMar Anderson delinquent in 
the payment of support monies in the amount of "$200.00 
per month i.e. $50.00 for each minor child" from the date 
of entry of the divorce decree for an accrued total sum of 
$10,635.50 with interest in the amount of $3,203.13, mak-. 
ing a total judgment against the Defendant of $13,838.63 
(R. 203, Vol. 2). Included therein \vas the a1nount of 
$4,484.41 found to be owing under the Baker Decree of 
August 26, 1952 (Findings of Fact, R. 199-202, 'T ol. :2). In 
addition to the foregoing a\vard for support n1oney, the 
court below awarded judgment against the Defendant to 
the effect that he pay premiluns on Beneficial Life Insur-
ance Policies Nos. 251152, 251077, and 158875 in the 
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aggregate amount of $1,389.48 (R. 203, Vol.· 2). From the 
latter award the Appellant does not appeal and admits 
owing that amount. 
Separation agreements are not contrary to public 
policy and they are generally enforced by the courts of 
this country and of England (see 17 Am. Jur., Divorce 
and Separation, Sec. 722, et seq.) ; they have been sus-
tained by this court. Johnson v. Johnson, 107 Utah 147, 
152 P. 2d 426; Barraclough v. Barraclough, 100 Utah 196, 
111 P. 2d 792; Jones v. Jones, 104 Utah 275, 139 P. 2d 
222. Our court said, in the case of Hall v. Hall, 111 Utah 
263, 177 P. 2d 731, at 733 : 
"It is true that we have held that a stipula-
tion for an alimony settlement is only a recom-
mendation to the court-Jones v. Jones, 104 Utah 
275, 139 P. 2d 222- but we did not mean by that 
that it was to be given no weight at all. Absent 
any proof to the contrary the lower court should 
assume that the parties best know their own finan-
cial standing and capabilities, and accept their 
stipulations for its face value, unless the record 
before the court obviously indicates that to accept 
the stipulation would not accomplish equity. To 
ignore the wishes of the parties without grounds 
for doing so clearly is an arbitrary and capricious 
act." 
The agreement between the parties should be en-
forced and if there is to be subsequent change or a nevv'" 
order made, it must be upon proper procedure and only 
after a showing by the moving party of a change in con-
ditions since the entry of the decree. Gardner v. Gardner, 
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111 Utah 286·, 177 P. 2d 743. In the case of Openshaw v. 
Openshaw, 105 Utah 574, 144 P. 2d 528, this court held 
that the right of a trial court to modify an alimony or 
support money award did not extend to installr.11ents that 
had accrued; it follows, does it not, that where, as here, 
under the terms of the decree, nothing had become due 
or had accrued, it would not be within the province of the 
court to enter judgment for a sum not owing thereunder. 
In the cause at bar, we do not come before this 
court on the issue of the responsibility of a father to 
support his children. Our cause would have little merit 
if such were our contention. We readily concede that the 
obligation does exist and that it is the prerogative, and 
in fact the obligation, of the courts of this state to en-
force such an obligation when they are properly called 
upon so to do. 
May we take the liberty of pointing out to the 
Court that under terms of the Stipulation and Agree-
ment between the parties heTeto and the decree of di-
vorce, all Mrs. Pluckard need have done to commence her 
entitlement to payments of support n1oney in the sun1 of 
$200.00 per month by this plaintiff 'vas to sell the pro-
perty in Phoenix, Arizona and to have exhausted one-
half of the net proceeds therefrom at the rate of $250.00 
per month. Mrs. Pluckard's entitlen1ent to payments in 
the amount of $200.00 from l\Ir. Anderson would have 
immediately accrued upon the exhaustion of the funds 
received from the sale, regardless of "-rhat amount of 
moneys the property might have been sold for. 
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POINT II. 
TI-iE COURT BELOVv ERR.ED IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS ESTOPPED TO CLAilVI ANY 
SUPPORT MONEY, AS SHE FAILED TO DO EQUITY 
IN REFUSING AND F AILil\IG TO SELL THE PROPERTY 
AS PROVIDED IN THE DECREE OF DIVORCE, AND AS 
DIRECTED BY THE BAKER DECREE OF AUGUST 26, 1952. 
Although it is Defendant's position that there can 
be no obligation to pay support money until the property 
on West McKinley Street is sold as contemplated by 
the original decree and the contract of the parties, in 
the alternative, he contends that plaintiff is estopped 
from claiming any support money because of her fail-
ure to join in the sale of the property as decreed by 
both the original decree and the order of Judge Baker 
on August 26, 1952. 
That Plaintiff refused to sell is established by the 
great weight of the evidence, overwhelmingly so, not 
only from the testimony of the Defendant to that effect, 
but from the conduct of the Plaintiff and the course 
of events that follow. Particularly often Judge Baker 
held in August of 1952, that the payment of support 
money was not a condition of the sale of the property, 
Plaintiff concluded that it was not to her interest to sell 
and she resisted all efforts to do so and started a course 
of action to deprive the Defendant of all of the benefits 
in the property. 
Plaintiff made what she regarded as a token effort 
to comply with the court order when she secured an offer 
from her uncle for the net sum of $197.20; however, that 
such was made in bad faith and that she never did 
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intend to sell is unquestionably established by her con-
duct in refusing an offer submitted by Defendant's 
attorney just six days after of $2,000 net. Had Plaintiff 
consented to this sale, she would not only have complied 
with the court's orders and the agreement of the parties, 
but she would have removed any objections of D·efendant 
to the payment of support money. She decided to 
eliminate any interest of the Defendant in the property 
and secure it all for herself. To do this, however, Plain-
tiff had to have the cooperation of her uncle and he 
obliged by reducing his claim to judg1nent, which was 
the obligation of both parties, each to pay one-half, 
and by his buying the property in at execution sale. That 
this was a fraud on the Defendant and the Court is 
apparent from the fact that Plaintiff's uncle never did 
take possession of the property and Plaintiff not only 
continued in possession but she continued to collect and 
keep all of the rents. Furthermore, in 1956, without her 
uncle's consent or request, she and her present husband, 
whom she ·married in 1954, on their initiative proceeded 
to remodel the property under contract entered into by 
them in the sum of $7,614.88, intending personally to 
pay for same. To accomplish this, they secured a $2,500 
loan under FHA Title I. Plaintiff n1ade no request of 
her uncle to pay the remodeling obligation and he did 
not do so, even though the contractor on default reduced 
his claim to judgment and purchased it at execution 
sale (that at the time of the hearing belo,Y, Plaintiff and 
husband were still in possession, the rede1nption period 
had not expired. The record doesn't disclose whether 
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or not they are still in possession), as she and her 
husband regarded the obligation as theirs and not her 
uncle's. All of the foregoing occurred notwithstanding the 
fact that the Plaintiff claimed that she had no interest in 
the property. No other conclusion can be reached but 
that Plaintiff never intended, particularly after the 
Baker Decree, to comply with the terms of the original 
divorce decree and the order of Judge Baker as to sale 
of the property. In light of the foregoing, the Defendant 
contends that the Plaintiff is estopped from any claim 
as to support money and that his obligation regarding 
same must again, as of now, be determined in view of 
the fact that he now has custody of the three younger 
children, supporting them as a result of their having 
been taken from the Plaintiff by the Juvenile Court of 
the Superior Court of the County of Maricopa, State 
of Arizona and placed in the custody of Defendant and 
his present wife in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
This judgment, if allowed to stand, will inure, not 
to the benefit of the minor children of the parties, but 
rather to the benefit of Plaintiff and her present hus-
band, contrary to rule of this court made the Larsen 
case. Larsen v. Larsen (Utah) 300 P. 2d 596. 
30 A. Am. Jur. p. 710 Sec. 765. 
19 Am. Jur. p. 323 Sec.: 469-479. 
POINT III. 
IN THE ALTER.NATE, THE COURT ERRED IN FAIL-
ING TO FIND THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ESTOPPED FROM 
CLAIMING ANY SUPPORT MONEY BECAUSE O·F HER 
WILFUL FAILURE TO KEEP RECORDS OF THE INCOME 
RECEIVED AND HER FALSIFICATION OF THE AMOUNT 
RECEIVED AND BECAUSE OF THE COURT'S INABILITY 
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TO DETER.MINE THE AMO·UNT O·F INCO·l\tiE R.ECEIVED 
FROM THE PROPERTY. 
POINT IV 
THAT, IN THE ALTERNATE, THE COURT ERRED IN 
FAILING ~~o FIND THAT RENTS AND PROFITS RE-
CEIVE.D FROM THE PROPERTY ARE PROPER AS OFF-
SETS AGAINST SUPPORT MONEY, IF ANY. 
Points 3 and 4 are so related that they will be dis-
cussed together. In the alternate, the Defendant contends 
that if the court is to make a new contract as to property 
and hold that payment of support money is not condi-
tioned on the sale of the property, that the contract 
should be construed as to allow the Defendant a credit 
for the net amount of the income received from rents 
for the property by the Plaintiff, which she always col-
lected and used, and as this cannot be determined because 
of her failure to keep or produce records as to income and 
her falsification of the amount received, that she should 
be estopped from climing any support money, or at the 
very minimum that the Defendant should receive credit 
of $180, per month, that a1nount being the fair net 
monthly rental value of the units. 
Up to the date of the Baker Decree of August 26, 
1952, Plaintiff kept a record of the expenses incurred 
in the operation of the property \Vhich she says an1ounted 
to $6,293.17, and that, although she had no records of 
income, and she said that during the same period the 
income amounted to only $100-$200 a year, and that al-
though she had few tenants, tl1e electric charges alnount-
ed to approximately $350.00 a year. 
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In the light of this e.i. failure to keep records and 
failure to disclose truthfully the amount of income thus 
preventing the court from determining the amount of 
income from the property, she ought to be estopped from 
claiming any support money, particularly since she has 
always collected the rents from the property ~nd at the 
very minimum the Defendant should be allowed a credit 
of $180 per month, that being the net amount the prop-
erty should have produced and this should date from the 
·date of the first decree, September 26, 1949, as Judge 
Baker in his decision refused to allow such, as did Judge 
Larson. Plaintiff should be required to do equity. 
POINT V. 
IN THE ALTERNATE, THE COlJ:RT ER.RED IN FAIL-
ING TO FIND THE VALUE OF THE PROPER,TY, AND 
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE SUFFERED BY DEFENDANT 
IN PLAI!~TIFF'S REFUSAL TO SELL THE PROPERTY. 
POINT VI. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT INTO 
EVIDENCE DEFEl'TDANT'S OFFERED EXHIBIT 3. 
Points 5 and 6 are so related that they will be 
discussed together. 
In the alternate, Defendant further contends that 
he should be allowed a credit against judgment for the 
damage sustained by him because of Plaintiff's refusal 
to sell the property in question. 
At the time of the divorce in 1949, Defendant testi-
fied the property was worth from $15,000 to $20,000 
and, although Plaintiff testified that the property was 
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worthless, in 1948, in a letter to the Defendant's father, 
at a time when there was no controversy bet\veen the 
parties, Defendant offered "Exhibit 3 D" which was 
·refused in evidence, Plaintiff put a value of $18,000 on 
the property. In view of this and Plaintiff's refusal 
to sell as herenbefore discussed, Plaintiff breached her 
contract and Defendant has been damaged % the value 
of the property, or from $7,500 to $10,000 (R. 8-9, 11, 
38, Vol. 2) and he should be allowed a set-off in this 
amount. 
Exhibit D-3 was material and relevant, not only to 
set a value on the property for the purpose of determin-
ing the damage suffered by Defendant but to show the 
intent of the Parties as to the agreement to sell the 
property before support money was required to be paid. 
In view of the fact that Plaintiff 'Yas in possession 
of the income producing property, it would support De-
fendants contention that it was the intent that no support 
money be paid while she received inco1ne from the prop-
erty. 
POINT VII. 
THE CO·URT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF 
HAD MADE REASONABLE ATTEMPT TO FIND A BUYER 
FOR THE PR.OPERTY, AND WAS UNABLE TO DO SO, 
AND THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT COOPERATE WITH 
PLAINTIFF TO SECURE A BUYER, AND THAT HE TOOK 
INCON,CLUSIVE STEPS OF HIS OWN TO SELL IT. 
Defendant contends that, in vie'Y of the evidence 
that there is no basis for the court finding that he 
refused to cooperate in the sale of the property and 
that the Plaintiff expended a reasonable effort to find 
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a buyer and that the Defendant took inconclusive efforts 
of himself. 
For purpose of brevity, we call the court's attention 
to our discussion under point No. 2 of the evidence 
·relating to the refusal of the Plaintiff to sell the property 
and of her conduct in depriving the Defendant of his 
interest in it. We see no reason to belabor the point 
further. 
·CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Defendant submits: 
1. That there can be only one construction of the 
agreement of the parties which was incorporated and 
made a part of the decree of divorce, namely that De-
fendant was not required to pay any support money 
until property on West McKinley Street, valuable income 
producing property, proceeds of which Plaintiff has 
always received, had been sold and the Defendant's part, 
lf2 of the sale price;had bee~ exhausted for the support 
of the children. 
2. That in any event, because of Plaintiff's failure 
to sell the property, notwithstanding Judge Baker's 
order, as a result of which Defendant by Plaintiff's action 
was deprived of his interest in the property, that she 
should be estopped from claiming any unpaid support 
money that to do otherwise would be inequitable, espe-
. cially as any money received by her would not inure to 
the benefit of the parties' children, but rather to the 
Plantiff and her present husband. 
3. That in the alternate, that the income received 
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by Plaintiff from the property should be credited against 
any obligation of the Defendant and as this cannot be 
determined as these facts are solely known by the Plain-
tiff, which information she refuses to give, she should 
be estopped from claiming any amount whatsoever or 
at the very minimum, the Defendant should be allowed 
a credit of $180 per ·month the net rent value of the 
premises after the payment of expenses, from the date 
of entry of the divorce decree to the date of this hearing. 
Plaintiff should be required to do equity. 
4. In the alternate, Defendant should be allowed 
a credit of from $7,500 to $10,000, the amount of damage 
sustained by him being, deprived of ¥2 the value of 
the property, which resulted from Plaintiff's breach of 
contract in her refusal to see the property. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRED L. FINLINSON 
L. DELOS DAINES 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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